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Summary
The Department of the Navy (DoN) has several efforts underway to transform U.S.
naval forces to prepare them for future military challenges.  The Navy is organizing
these efforts under a newly announced conceptual framework called Sea Power 21.  Key
elements of naval transformation include a focus on operating in littoral waters,
network-centric operations, use of unmanned vehicles, new-design ships requiring
much-smaller crews, directly launching and supporting expeditionary operations ashore
from sea bases, new kinds of naval formations, and new ship-deployment cycles for
increasing ship-utilization rates.  Naval transformation poses several potential issues for
Congress.  This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
This report focuses on the transformation of U.S. naval forces – the Navy and the
Marine Corps, which are both contained in the Department of the Navy (DoN).1
What is defense transformation?  The Bush Administration has identified
transformation as a major goal for the Department of Defense, and has stated that defense
programs will be assessed in terms of their potential for contributing to defense
transformation.  Defense transformation has been defined in several ways.  For this report,
it can be defined as large-scale, discontinuous, and possibly disruptive changes in military
weapons, organization, and concepts of operations (i.e., approaches to warfighting), that
are prompted by significant changes in technology or the emergence of new and different
international security challenges.  In contrast to incremental or evolutionary military
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change brought about by normal modernization efforts, defense transformation is more
likely to feature discontinuous or disruptive forms of change  There have been a few
military transformations in recent decades; examples that are sometimes cited include
Germany’s creation in the 1930s of the concept of rapid blitzkrieg-style warfare and the
U.S. Navy’s creation at the same time of long-distance, aircraft carrier-centered naval
warfare as a replacement for battleship-centered operations.
Some military analysts believe that recent new technologies – including advanced
information technologies (IT) for networked operations, distributed sensors, unmanned
vehicles, and precision-guided munitions – have set the stage for a new defense
transformation.  They also believe that U.S. military forces must transform themselves if
they are to be adequately prepared for 21st-Century military challenges, particularly so-
called asymmetric challenges, in which adversaries avoid competing head-on against
current U.S. military strengths.  One key asymmetric challenge, analysts believe, is the
need to counter so-called anti-access or area-denial capabilities – capabilities intended to
prevent U.S. forces from gaining access to the ports, airfields, bases, staging areas, and
littoral (near-shore) sea areas that the United States now depends on to mount military
operations in distant military theaters.  Systems for countering U.S. naval forces in littoral
areas could include diesel-electric submarines, mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, air-
defense systems, and potentially weapons of mass destruction.  Another key asymmetric
challenge, analysts believe, is the need to counter transnational terrorist networks.
Navy Sea Power 21 Framework.  DoN is organizing its transformation efforts
under a conceptual framework called Sea Power 21, which is built around three main
components – Sea Strike, which refers to the ability of naval forces to project precise and
persistent offensive power from the sea; Sea Shield, which refers to the ability of naval
forces to not only defend themselves at sea, but to contribute to homeland defense, project
an overland defensive shield to help protect overseas U.S. allies and friends, and provide
a sea-based theater and strategic defense against ballistic missiles; and Sea Basing, which
refers to the ability of naval forces to operate at sea, as sovereign entities, free from
concerns of access and political constraints associated with using land bases in other
countries.  These three components are to be supported and bound together by ForceNet,
the Navy’s overall architecture for combining the various computer networks that U.S.
naval forces are now fielding into a master computer network for tying together U.S.
naval personnel, ships, aircraft, and installations.  An additional part of Sea Power 21 is
a Global Concept of Operations under which various types of naval formations are to
be used for forward presence, crisis response, and warfighting operations.2
DoN Transformation Centers, Exercises, and Experiments.  Many DoN
transformation activities efforts take place at the Navy Warfare Development Command
(NWDC), which is located at the Naval War College at Newport, RI, and the Marine
Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), which is located at the Marine Corps Base at
Quantico, VA.  These two organizations generate ideas for naval transformation and act
as clearinghouses and evaluators of transformation ideas generated in other parts of DoN.
NWDC and MCWL oversee major exercises, known as Fleet Battle Experiments (FBEs)
and Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), that are intended to explore new naval
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concepts of operation.  The Navy and Marine Corps also participate with the Army and
Air Force in joint exercises aimed at testing transformation ideas.
Key Features of Naval Transformation.  Table 1 below summarizes several
key features of U.S. naval transformation.
Table 1.  Key Features of U.S. Naval Transformation
Previous U.S. naval forces Transformed U.S. naval forces
Plan for stand-alone, mid-ocean operations
against Soviet naval forces
Plan for joint operations in littoral waters
against regional adversaries
Platform-centric operations Network-centric operations
Manned platforms only Significant use of unmanned vehicles
Manpower-intensive ships; people treated
as a “free good”
Ships with smaller (i.e., “lean,” optimal)
crews; cost of personnel fully recognized
Multiple aircraft sorties per target Multiple targets per aircraft sortie
Bases, logistic “piles” established ashore to
support expeditionary operations
Expeditionary operations launched and
supported directly from sea bases
Stealth mostly in submarines and SEALs Stealth spreads to aircraft, surface ships
Primary formations are carrier battle groups
and amphibious ready groups
Use of new, flexible naval formations, such
as expeditionary strike groups
Traditional ship-deployment cycles New ship-deployment cycles for increased
ship-utilization rates
Traditional business practices Streamlined, reformed practices
Focus on littoral operations.  In late 1992, with the publication of a Navy
document entitled ... From the Sea, the Navy formally shifted the focus of its planning
away from the familiar Cold War scenario of countering Soviet naval forces in mid-ocean
waters and toward the very different post-Cold War scenario of operating in littoral (near-
shore) waters to counter the land- and sea-based forces of potential regional aggressors.
This shift has led to numerous changes for the Navy in concepts of operation, training,
and equipment over the last 11 years.  Among other things, it moved the focus of Navy
planning from a geographic environment where it could expect to operate primarily by
itself to one where it would need to be able to operate effectively in a joint manner,
alongside other U.S. forces.  It also led to an increased emphasis on amphibious warfare,
mine warfare, and defense against diesel-electric submarines and small surface craft.  The
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program is a key current Navy effort intended to improve the
Navy’s ability to operate in heavily defended littoral waters.3 
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Network-centric operations.  The concept of network-centric operations, also
called network-centric warfare (NCW), is a key feature of transformation for all U.S.
military services.  The concept, which emerged in the late 1990s, involves using computer
networking technology to tie together personnel, ships, aircraft, and installations in a
series of local and wide-area networks capable of rapidly transmitting critical information.
Many in DoN believe that NCW will lead to changes in naval concepts of operation and
significantly increase U.S. naval capabilities and operational efficiency.  Key NCW
efforts include the Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) network, the Naval
Fires Network (NFN), the IT-21 investment strategy, and the above-mentioned ForceNet
effort.  A related program is the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI).4
Unmanned vehicles.  Many analysts believe that unmanned vehicles (UVs) will
be another central feature of U.S. military transformation.  Perhaps uniquely among the
military departments, DoN in coming years will likely acquire UVs of every major kind
– air, surface, underwater, and ground.  Widespread use of UVs could lead to significant
changes in the numbers and types of ships that the Navy procures in the future, in naval
concepts of operation, and in measurements of naval power.  The LCS is to deploy
various kinds of UVs as a principal means of defeating enemy anti-access/area-denial
systems in heavily defended littoral waters.  Unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and
unmanned combat air vehicles, or UCAVs (which are UAVs that carry weapons), if
implemented widely, could change the shape naval aviation.  Unmanned underwater
vehicles (UUVs) and UAVs could significantly expand the capabilities of Navy
submarines.5 
Smaller Ship Crews.  New technologies for automated ship operation and damage
control permit the design of ships with much smaller crews than those required by today’s
Navy ships.  Since personnel-related costs are a major contributor to total ship life-cycle
cost, designing and procuring ships with so-called “lean” or optimal crewing could lead
to significant savings over time.  Acquiring ships with significantly smaller crews could
lead to significant changes in Navy practices for recruiting, training, and otherwise
managing its personnel.  Current ship-acquisition programs related to this goal include the
LCS, the DD(X) destroyer,6 and the CVN-21 (formerly CVNX-1) aircraft carrier.7
Multiple targets per aircraft sortie.  The advent of air-launched precision-
guided munitions (PGMs) and associated targeting systems now permits U.S. strike
aircraft, including Navy carrier-based strike-fighters, to attack multiple targets during a
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single sortie – a major reversal from the previous situation of having to use multiple
aircraft sorties to attack a single target.8  Naval aviation officials believe that this advance,
combined with measures to increase the number of sorties that can be launched from a
carrier each day, will permit a carrier air wing in coming years to attack more than 1,000
separate target aim points during a 24-hour period, a several-fold increase over the older
figure.
Sea Basing.  Separate from its use as the name of one of the three main
components of the Sea Power 21 conceptual framework, DoN is using the term sea basing
in a second and somewhat more specific way, to refer to a new operational concept for
conducting overseas expeditionary operations.  Under the sea basing concept, the
expeditionary force’s command and control facilities, fire support assets (e.g., rockets and
missiles), and logistics support assets (i.e., supplies) would be located at sea rather than
at intermediary land bases that are established ashore.  Forces operating ashore would now
be launched, directed, and supported directly from ships at sea, without need for
establishing intermediary shore bases.  The sea basing concept of operations responds to
a central concern of transformation advocates – that fixed overseas land bases in the
future will become increasingly vulnerable to enemy anti-access/area-denial weapons such
as theater-range ballistic missiles.9  A key program related to the sea basing concept is the
Maritime Prepositioning Force of the Future (MPF[F]), which would replace the Corps’
current maritime prepositioning ships with new-design ships capable of supporting
Marine expeditionary operations in this new manner.  The concept of sea basing can be
applied to joint operations involving the Army and Air Force, and the office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) reportedly expressed interest in the concept.10
Stealth in Aircraft and Surface Ships. For many years, submarines and naval
special operations forces (called SEALs for Sea, Air, and Land) were the primary naval
forces employing stealth.  DoN plans to spread the use of stealth in naval forces to aircraft
and surface ships through programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF),11 the LCS, and
the DD(X) destroyer.
New Kinds of Naval Formations.  The Navy in the past has relied on carrier
battle groups (CVBGs) and amphibious ready groups (ARGs) as its standard ship
formations.  As mentioned earlier, as part of its new Global Concept of Operations, the
Navy plans to begin using new kinds of naval formations – such as expeditionary strike
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groups, or ESGs (i.e., amphibious ships combined with surface combatants and attack
submarines), missile defense surface action groups, and modified Trident submarines
carrying cruise missiles and special operations forces – for forward presence, crisis
response, and warfighting operations.12
New Ship-Deployment Concepts.  The Navy is beginning to experiment with
new ship-deployment concepts – such as multiple crewing and long-duration deployments
with crew rotation – that could achieve a significant reduction in Navy stationkeeping
multipliers, which are the numbers of Navy ships of a certain kind that are needed to keep
one such ship on station in an overseas operating area.  Such new ship-deployment
concepts, if implemented widely, could permit the Navy to maintain a given level of naval
forward presence with fewer ships.13
Improved Business Practices.  DoN is pursuing a variety of strategies to
improve its processes and business practices so as to generate savings that can be used to
help finance Navy transformation.  Under the Sea Power 21 framework, these efforts are
referred to collectively as Sea Enterprise.
Issues for Congress
In assessing current DoN transformation efforts, potential questions for Congress
include the following:
! Are current DoN transformation efforts inadequate, excessive, or about
right?
! Does DoN have an adequate roadmap for guiding its transformation
efforts?
! Is DoN placing too much or too little emphasis on certain components of
transformation?
! Is DoN achieving a proper balance between transformation and
potentially competing program goals, such as maintaining near-term
readiness and near-term equipment procurement?
! Are DoN transformation efforts adequately coordinated with those of the
Army and Air Force?
! Is there sufficient consensus on the definition of transformation, and over
which programs or efforts might qualify as transformational?
! Is the term transformation being abused as an all-purpose tool for
justifying or opposing certain programs?
! Is the Administration using the term transformation in part to cloud
potential issues pertaining to its defense plans, or to keep Congress off
balance as it conducts oversight of those plans?
